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We model the choice of loan currency in a framework which features a trade-off between 
lower cost of debt and the risk of firm-level distress costs. Under perfect information 
foreign currency funds come at a lower interest rate, all foreign currency earners as well as 
those local currency earners with high revenues and/or low distress costs choose foreign 
currency loans. When the banks have imperfect information on the currency and level of 
firm revenues, even more local earners switch to foreign currency loans, as they do not bear 
the full cost of the corresponding credit risk. 
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A large proportion of corporations in many countries have been traditionally 
borrowing in a foreign currency.1 More recently and prior to the financial crisis also many 
retail clients, i.e., households and small firms, have taken out foreign currency loans. In 
countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, for example, retail clients still 
hold a similar or larger share of their loans in foreign currency than corporations (European 
Central Bank (2010)). 
These retail loans in foreign currency are popularly believed to be "small men’s carry 
trades",2 i.e., loans in which households and entrepreneurs seek lower interest rates and take 
unhedged exchange rate risk upon themselves (Sorsa, Bakker, Duenwald, Maechler and 
Tiffin (2007)). Yet in an empirical study Brown, Ongena and Yeşin (2011) document that 
foreign currency borrowing by small firms in transition countries is much stronger related 
to (firm-level) foreign currency revenues than it is to (country-level) interest rate 
differentials.3 Thus ―carry-trade behavior‖ may in fact not be the key driver of foreign 
currency borrowing (see also Brown and De Haas (2012)). 
                                                 
1 In East Asia, corporate debt is split about equally between foreign and domestic currencies (Allayannis, 
Brown and Klapper (2003)) while in several Latin American countries the share of foreign currency debt 
exceeds 20 percent (Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli (2003)). Between 20 and 75 percent of all corporate 
loans in Eastern European countries are denominated in a foreign currency (European Central Bank (2006), p. 
39). 
2 Wall Street Journal, May 29th, 2007. Carry trades, in which investors borrow in a low-yielding currency and 
invest in a high-yielding one, are a widespread phenomenon. At the beginning of 2007 it was estimated that 
that as much as US$1 trillion was involved in the yen carry trade for example (The Economist, February 1st, 
2007). Traditionally, carry trades have been made by large financial institutions and leveraged institutions, 
such as hedge funds. Low exchange rate volatility and persistent interest rate differentials have fueled the 
growth in cross-currency positions in recent years (Galati, Heath and McGuire (2007)). 
3 They investigate the currency denomination of individual bank loans granted to 3,101 small firms in 25 
transition countries between 2002 and 2005. Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2010) examine the requested 
and granted loan currency of small business loans granted by one retail bank in Bulgaria. Other studies have 
examined foreign currency borrowing by analyzing aggregate cross-country data (e.g., Basso, Calvo-
Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2011), Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008), Luca and Petrova (2008)) or the currency 
denomination of debt of large firms within a single country (Kedia and Mozumdar (2003), Keloharju and 
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Though a number of recent theoretical papers have started to model the choice of loan 
currency in a way that may also be relevant for small firms (Allayannis, Brown and 
Klapper (2003)), a theoretical framework to understand foreign currency borrowing in retail 
credit markets where informational asymmetries are acute is still lacking (see also the 
review in Nagy, Jeffrey and Zettelmeyer (2011)). 
In this paper we aim to fill this gap in the literature by introducing an information 
asymmetry between banks and firms in a framework that also features a trade-off between 
the cost and risk of debt. We conjecture that banks do not necessarily know the currency in 
which (small) firms have contracted their sales, and/or the firms' actual revenue levels, an 
issue that may be particularly relevant in transition and developing countries. 
Information asymmetries between banks and firms underpin our modern 
understanding of financial intermediation (Freixas and Rochet (2008)) and the asymmetries 
may be aggravated in transition and developing countries. The currency denomination of a 
firm’s current and future sales contracts is often negotiated (and a closely guarded secret).4 
Depending on bank type, size or ownership and the degree of competition in the banking 
sector, banks may have difficulties or lack incentives to collect detailed information about 
firm revenues. 
The costs of information acquisition are particularly high when dealing with small 
firms, which are less likely to have audited financial accounts,5 and when dealing with 
                                                                                                                                                     
Niskanen (2001), Benavente, Johnson and Morande (2003), Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005), Gelos 
(2003)) or across countries (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2001), Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003), Cowan (2006), Esho, Sharpe and Webster (2007), Kamil 
(2009), and Kamil and Sutton (2008)). Clark and Judge (2008) provides a review of the relevant empirical 
literature. 
4 See Friberg and Wilander (2008). Firm risk aversion (Viaene and de Vries (1992)), currency variability 
(Engel (2006)) and medium of exchange considerations (Rey (2001)) may determine currency choice. 
5 Firms in transition and developing countries often borrow without having any audited statements (e.g., 
Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (2000)). In addition, banks often cannot verify firm sales information through 
advanced cash management services which are yet to be introduced there, either because banks do not offer 
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firms that are located in transition and developing countries, where due to the weak 
corporate legal system it is hard for banks to assess the credibility of available firm-level 
financial information (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000), Brown, Jappelli and Pagano 
(2009)). Firms therefore often borrow without having audited statements. Banks also can 
not verify firm sales information through advanced cash management services, which are 
yet to be introduced in many firms. Consequently, ―soft‖ information may be the only type 
of information that is available, but foreign banks  which are widely present in transition 
and developing countries  may struggle to collect and use it (Stein (2002), Detragiache, 
Tressel and Gupta (2008)). 
Our model clarifies how the choice of loan currency is affected by the bank’s lack of 
information about the currency denomination and level of the firm’s revenues, an acute 
issue for many banks when dealing with small firms in transition and developing countries.6 
Existing models demonstrate that firms' choice of loan denomination is affected by the 
structure of firm revenues,7 interest rate differentials between local and foreign currency 
                                                                                                                                                     
these services (e.g., Tsamenyi and Skliarova (2005)) or firms do not demand them (for example, in the survey 
analyzed in Brown, Ongena and Yeşin (2011), one third of the firms report receiving less than one third of 
their income through their banks). Banks may also lack information on firm quality, project choice, or 
managerial effort, for example, incurring monitoring costs (Diamond (1984), Diamond (1991)) or forming 
relationships with the firms (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2004), Hauswald and Marquez 
(2006), or Egli, Ongena and Smith (2006), among others). 
6 Consequently, we do not discuss: (1) International taxation issues such as tax loss carry forwards and 
limitations on foreign tax credits; (2) The possibilities for international income shifting; (3) The differential 
costs across countries of derivatives to create synthetic local debt; and (4) Clientele effects in issuing public 
bonds. These issues are clearly important when analyzing the debt structure of large corporations. 
7 If the firm’s cash flows are in foreign currency, borrowing in the same foreign currency will provide a 
straightforward natural hedge (Goswami and Shrikhande (2001)). Mian (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston 
(1998), Brown (2001) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), among others, analyze the hedging of foreign 
currency exposure, using forward contracts and derivatives for example. But many developing country 
currencies have no forward markets; and even in those that do, there are substantial costs to hedging (Frankel 
(2004)). And even in developed countries small firms rarely use derivatives to hedge their net currency 
exposure (Briggs (2004), Børsum and Ødegaard (2005), and O'Connell (2005), among others). As expected 
therefore, small firms in developing countries not uncommonly default on loans in foreign currency following 
a deep depreciation of the local currency (Ziaul Hoque (2003)). 
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funds,8 and the distress costs of firms facing potential default (see Allayannis, Brown and 
Klapper (2003) for an overview). 
Our theoretical model augments extant work, by featuring not only the trade-off 
between the risk and the cost of debt, but also a relevant information asymmetry between 
banks and firms that can have either domestic or foreign currency earnings.9 Our model 
first confirms that under perfect information if there is an interest rate differential in favor 
of foreign currency funds, all foreign currency earners will prefer foreign currency loans. In 
addition, all local currency earners with low distress costs and high revenues will also 
choose foreign currency loans. In contrast, local currency earning firms with high distress 
costs and low revenues will prefer local currency loans. Then our model shows that if banks 
cannot identify either the currency or the level of the revenues of the firm, more local 
earners will borrow in foreign currency as the firms do not bear the full cost of the 
corresponding default risk. 
Consequently, our model identifies the information asymmetry between lending 
banks and borrowing firms as a so far overlooked potential driver of ―dollarization‖ in the 
credit markets. We also find the conditions under which all firms will be borrowing in 
foreign currency (full pooling equilibria), as well as no foreign currency loans will be 
                                                 
8 Static capital structure trade-off theory suggests firms opt for the lowest cost debt, making the interest rate 
differential, i.e., the deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), the second main determinant of 
the firm's choice of loan currency denomination (Graham and Harvey (2001)). 
9 In Jeanne (2000) financiers face an information asymmetry concerning the effort level of the exporting 
entrepreneurs. Exporters borrow locally in domestic or foreign currency. But borrowing in a foreign currency 
serves as a commitment device: The entrepreneurs have a stronger incentive for effort if they have foreign 
currency debt, because failure to achieve high returns is automatically sanctioned by termination. In Cowan 
(2006) firms with more foreign income and firms in countries with a higher interest differential (where 
foreign currency funds are cheaper) will have more foreign debt. Firms that are more financially constrained, 
i.e., firms that experience a higher risk premium when borrowing from a bank, are more likely to match the 
denomination of debt to their income streams. These firms would have to borrow at higher costs if they 
become financially distressed due to the accumulated currency mismatches. If a bank knows a firm is 
mismatched, it may pass on the corresponding expected default costs. In contrast to Jeanne (2000), in which 
firms only have foreign revenues, firms in our model have domestic or foreign currency earnings. In Jeanne 
(2000) entrepreneurial effort is unobservable to the financiers; in our model, the currency in which sales are 
contracted and sales revenues are collected cannot be observed by the bank. 
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offered by banks to firms who cannot prove they have either high or foreign currency 
income (market failure). The key predictions of our model are consistent with for example 
recent evidence by Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk and Kozak (2012) who find that foreign 
banks that enter via greenfield investment, and that may face more information asymmetry 
than those foreign banks that enter via domestic take-overs, lend more in foreign currency. 
We leave the more comprehensive testing of our model hypotheses to future empirical 
research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our model assumptions are introduced 
in Section II, followed in Section III by the analysis of the model with perfect information. 
In Section IV imperfect information is introduced. Section V concludes and summarizes all 
key firm- and country-level empirical predictions. 
II. Model Assumptions 
Define 
te , the exchange rate at time t , to equal the amount of local currency per unit 
of foreign currency, normalized at 0t  to 10 e . At 1t , the local currency either 
appreciates to 1Ae , with probability p , or it depreciates to 1De , with probability 
p1 . We assume that 1)1(  DA epep , so that the expected exchange rate at 1t  










There is a continuum of firms and each firm needs to invest 1I  in local currency at 
0t  to receive any revenues at 1t . Firms differ in their revenue structure. There are 
three types of firms, foreign ( F ), good local ( LG ) and bad local ( LB ) currency earners. 
                                                 
10 As we assume that the level of firm revenues does not change with the exchange rate, the changes in the 
exchange rate in our model are assumed to be real. 
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Foreign currency earners have revenue FR in foreign currency, which equals the expected 
revenue in local currency as the expected exchange rate equals one ( 1*1 e , hence 
FF ReR *1 ). The other two types of firms have local currency earnings. The good local 
currency earners have high earnings LGR  in local currency, while the bad local currency 
earners have low earnings in local currency, LGLB RR  . We abstract from the possibility 
that foreign currency earners may differ in their income levels and from exchange rate pass-
through considerations, as neither issue alters the main insights of our model.11 
Let all firm types be physically located in the domestic country. Their owners will 
spend their profits locally, so firms care about their expected payoff in local currency. 
Firms maximize their expected income and have no other wealth (and are thus limited 
liable).12 
There are at least two identical banks that offer loans in both local and foreign 
currency and that are engaged in Bertrand competition setting prices simultaneously. When 
they can identify firm type, they charge a net interest rate j
kr  on a loan in foreign or local 
currency k , };{ lfk , to a firm of type };;{ LGLBFj .13 Banks have no capacity limits on 
foreign or local currency funds. We normalize the cost of foreign currency funds to 0fi  
and set the unit cost of local currency funds to 
li . We assume that the uncovered interest 
rate parity (UIP) is not fulfilled, and that there is an interest rate advantage to foreign 
                                                 
11 Under perfect information, all foreign currency earners would take foreign currency loans at the same 
interest rate independent of their revenue level. With asymmetric information about firm revenues this result 
also holds for reasonable assumptions on firm-level distress costs, as we show in an earlier version of our 
model (Brown, Ongena, Popov and Yeşin (2011)). See Goldberg and Knetter (1997), for example, on 
exchange rate pass-through. 
12 While we assume that firms maximize expected income, their payoff is not linear in expected income when 
we assume distress costs. The assumption of distress costs implies that firms care about income variance, as 
would be the case if we assumed firms were risk-averse. 
13 Firms in our model receive both their expected income and their loan in a single  though not necessarily 
the same  currency. Without qualitatively affecting the main hypotheses, our model is readily extendable to 
include firms that receive their expected income and loans in varying proportions in multiple currencies. 
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currency funding for the bank, i.e., 0 eii fl . Extensive empirical research, using a 
variety of methods, finds that the UIP rarely holds. Furthermore, the literature finds that the 
deviation from the UIP in emerging markets is systematic in nature and that a significant 
part of the excess return can be attributed to a risk premium.14 
For simplicity we assume that interest payments are made upfront at 0t , and the 
loan repayment is made at 1t .15 Firms' earnings are verifiable ex post, so that payments 
are enforceable if a firm has sufficient earnings. 
We assume that the exchange rate volatility is such that bad local currency earners 
will always default if they take a loan in foreign currency and the local currency 
depreciates, i.e., 
D
LB eR  . We also assume that all good local currency earners have 
sufficient revenues to pay back their loan regardless of the exchange rate movements, i.e., 
D
LG eR  . Moreover, we assume that foreign currency earners have revenues that will 







If firms default on a loan, they face costs of financial distress. For example, defaulters 
can henceforth find external financing only at penalty costs. In this case, the distress costs 
C may be proportional to or convex in the default amount (though still homogenous across 
firms). Alternatively, these costs may involve the private value to its owner of a firm that is 
lost in bankruptcy (for example, in the case of small and family-owned firms (Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993))).16 In this case, C will be independent of the default amount, 
                                                 
14 General reviews by Hodrick (1987), Froot and Thaler (1990), Lewis (1995), Engel (1996), for example. For 
emerging markets, see Francis, Hasan and Hunter (2002) and Alper, Ardic and Fendoglu (2009). 
15 Given our focus, we do not derive the optimality of this debt contract (see Townsend (1979) for example). 




but will be heterogeneous among firms. As the focus of our analysis is the information 
asymmetry between banks and small firms, we assume that distress costs (in local currency 
units) differ across firms in each type. Among each type of firm  };;{ LGLBFj  there is 
a share    with low costs C  costs and a share  1   with high distress costs C .
17 
Given the above assumptions, the expected payoff j
kv  in local currency to a firm of 
type j  taking a loan of type k  equals: 
[1] 
   



















, ,(or    if)1(
. 
III. Perfect Information Case 
When banks are perfectly informed about the type of each firm, each bank sets six 
interest rates. For each of the three firm types, };;{ FLBLGj , they set two interest rates, 
depending on whether a foreign or local currency loan is offered. 
 
Proposition 1: Under perfect information, all F  and LG  firms take foreign currency 
loans. The equilibrium share of LB  firms that choose foreign currency loans is given as: 
[2] 
perfect info
0 if (1 )
if (1 ) (1 )



















                                                 
17 See Brown, Ongena and Yeşin (2009) for a version of the model with a continuous distribution of firms’ 
distress costs. A discrete distribution makes the analysis more elegant, yet does not alter the main intuition 
that asymmetric information leads to more foreign currency borrowing. 
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The expected profits of banks in local currency from each loan type are: 
[3] 




















; (or     if
. 
Assuming perfect price competition, the expected profit on each loan type will be 













r j F;LG  k f  







Inserting the equilibrium interest rates from [4] into [1], we obtain the following two 
results. Foreign currency earners ( F  types) as well as good local currency earning firms (
LG types) always choose foreign currency loans. And the condition for LB firms to choose 














































Proposition 1 shows that under perfect information foreign currency earners ( F  
types) always choose foreign currency loans. They do so because there is an interest rate 
advantage to foreign currency loans and they do not run the risk of incurring distress costs 
when taking such a loan. For the same reason, all good local currency earning firms ( LG  
types) also choose foreign currency loans. Bad local currency earning firms ( LB  types) 
face a trade-off: If they choose a foreign currency loan they benefit from an interest rate 
advantage, but they may incur distress costs if the local currency depreciates. As a 
consequence, if the interest rate differential is low, compared to the minimum distress costs 
of firms, i.e., when (   )     , we have a ―separating‖ equilibrium in which all LB  
types take local currency loans. If the interest rate differential is high, i.e., when (  
 )     , we have a ―pooling‖ equilibrium in which all firms take foreign currency loans. 
For intermediate values of interest rate differentials we have a ―partial pooling‖ equilibrium 
in which LB  firms with low distress costs take foreign currency loans. 
IV. Imperfect Information Case 
We now introduce an information asymmetry between banks and firms about the 
revenues of the firms. Assume that banks can neither verify the currency denomination nor 
the level of revenues of a firm, i.e., banks cannot distinguish between the three types of 
firms: F, LG, and LB firms. Banks, however, know that a proportion  1,0  of the total 
firm population are LB  firms, and that the remaining proportion 1  are either F  or LG  
11 
 
firms.18 Banks can no longer condition their interest rates on firm types, and thus only offer 
two rates: 
lr  for local currency loans and fr  for foreign currency loans.
19 































where  1,0  is the equilibrium share of LB  firms taking foreign currency loans. In 



























The interest rate charged on foreign currency loans covers the expected losses due to 
default on such loans. Under imperfect information, this depends on the share of LB  firms 
taking such loans relative to F  and LG  firms. 
Note that the interest rate that banks charge on foreign currency loans under 
asymmetric information lies between the rate it charges for such loans under perfect 
                                                 
18 The bank does not need to separate F from LG firms, as from the previous section we know that these two 
types never default on any loan, and thus should both receive the same (risk-free) interest rate on either a local 
or foreign currency loan. 
19 In our model all banks are equally affected by the information asymmetry regardless of the currency in 
which they lend. Most domestic and foreign banks in Eastern Europe for example offer loans in both local and 
foreign currency to local firms (see Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2010) and Brown, Ongena and Yeşin 
(2011)). If financiers lend only in their own currency, existing models predict that: (1) Firms may borrow first 
in the local and then in the foreign currency, after having exhausted internal funds, if local financiers have 
better information about the firm than foreign financiers (pecking order hypothesis); (2) Firms with high 
monitoring costs may borrow more locally in the local currency (Diamond (1984)); and (3) Better firms may 
borrow in the foreign currency to signal their quality, if foreign currency debt is more expensive (Jeanne 
(1999)) or entails more regulatory scrutiny hence higher distress costs (Ross (1977)). 
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information to F  and LG  firms, i.e., 0 , and the rate it charges to LB  firms, i.e.,   
   
(   )(    
  ). In other words,     [    
  ]. 




f CivCrv   will choose foreign 
currency loans. From [1] we see that the share of LB firms which will take foreign currency 
loans will be: 
[9] 
0 if (1 )( )
(1 )( ) (1 )( )if




f D l f D
LB
l f D
i r p C e R
r p C e R i r p C e R









         


     
 
From [9], we can establish that the lowest interest rate 
li  at which LB  firms start 
opting for foreign currency loans is   DLBl eRCpi  1 . We assume from now on that: 
[10] 0
LB
D ReC . 
Assumption [10] ensures that unless there is a positive interest rate differential to the 
advantage of foreign currency funds, all LB  firms will choose local currency loans. This 
assumption prevents that some LB  firms choose foreign currency loans due to their limited 
liability even in the absence of an interest rate differential. 
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 summarize how imperfect information changes the feasibility 
of separating, partial-pooling and full-pooling equilibria in our model. These propositions 
show that compared to the perfect information case a separating equilibrium exists only for 
lower interest rate differentials between local and foreign currency. Partial pooling and full 





Proposition 2 (Separating Equilibrium): If (1 )( )LBl Di p C e R      a separating 
equilibrium will emerge. 
Proof:  
In a separating equilibrium we have by definition    . From [8] the equilibrium 
interest rate for foreign currency loans is 0fr  . From [9] it follows that a separating 
equilibrium exists if  (1 )( )LBl Di p C e R      
 













    
 












    
 
a partial pooling equilibrium exists in 
which only LB firms with low distress costs C take foreign currency loans while LB firms 
with high distress costs C take local currency loans. 
Proof: 
In a partial pooling equilibrium we have by definition   . From [8] the 











From [9] it follows that only LB firms with low distress costs will chose a foreign currency 












    
 


















Proposition 4 shows that full pooling equilibria is feasible under imperfect 
information starting at a lower interest rate differential than under perfect information. 
 
Proposition 4 (Full Pooling Equilibrium):  
If    (1 ) 1 1 LBl Di p C p e R       a full pooling equilibrium exists in which 
all LB firms take foreign currency loans.  
Proof: 
In a full pooling equilibrium we have by definition 1  . From [8] the equilibrium 
interest rate for foreign currency loans is   1 LBf Dr p e R   . From [9] it follows 
that a separating equilibrium exists if     (1 ) 1 1 LBl Di p C p e R        
 
Note that in the partial-pooling and full-pooling equilibria described above we have 
assumed that LG and F firms chose foreign currency loans, which will be the case as long 
as ( )f lr i  . Assumption [10] ensures that in any equilibrium where 0   we have 
( )f lr i  . 
Figure 1 depicts the equilibria in our model under perfect and imperfect information. 
The figure shows that under perfect information there always exists either a separating, 
partial-pooling or full-pooling equilibrium. Under imperfect information two main things 
change: First, as mentioned above partial or fully-pooling equilibria exist at a larger range 
of interest rate differentials than under perfect information. This is due to the fact that 
foreign currency loans to LB firms are not fully pricing the credit risk of these loans due to 
expected exchange rate depreciations. 
15 
 
The second main difference under imperfect information is that the market for foreign 
currency loans may collapse. Proposition 5 summarizes the range of parameters for which 
an equilibrium with lending in foreign currency does not exist. 
 
Proposition 5 (Market Failure Asymmetric Information): Under asymmetric 
information, there is no equilibrium in which foreign currency loans are extended if one of 






      
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         
 





Follows directly from Propositions 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Proposition 5 and Figure 1 show that there are two constellations under which the 
market for foreign currency loans may collapse with imperfect information. The first 
constellation is a range of interest rate differentials [i] at which LB firms with low distress 
consider switching from local currency to foreign currency loans if banks charge zero 
interest rates on foreign currency loans. However, if the   LB firms with low distress 
costs would switch to foreign currency loans, the zero-profit interest rate on these loans 














. At that interest rate for foreign currency loans 
all LB firms will prefer to take local currency loans, and thus there is no equilibrium in 
which foreign currency loans are offered. 
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A similar effect lead to market collapse at interest rates in the range [ii], to the extent 
that these firms would be deterred from taking foreign currency loans. (1 )   LB firms 
with high distress costs consider switching from local currency to foreign currency loans. In 
both of these regions the only credit market equilibrium is characterized by all firms taking 
local currency loans. 
V. Conclusion and Testable Hypotheses 
Motivated by policy concerns about the credit risks resulting from unhedged foreign 
currency loans, especially in opaque financial environments, we investigate how an 
information asymmetry between banks and firms in a theoretical framework – that also 
features the trade-off between the cost and the risk of debt – may determine the currency 
denomination of bank loans to firms. Banks may not know the currency in which firms 
have contracted their sales or the level of firm revenues. 
Our model shows that foreign currency earners and local currency earners with 
distress costs that are small vis-à-vis the interest rate differential choose foreign currency 
loans if the foreign interest rate is lower. With imperfect information for the banks 
concerning the currency and level of firm revenues, we show that more local currency 
earners switch to foreign currency loans. 
Our model yields several testable hypotheses regarding the firm-level choice of loan 
denomination. We predict that the likelihood of choosing a foreign currency loan is 
positively related to the share of income a firm earns in foreign currency. Under the 
assumptions of our model, all foreign currency earners choose foreign currency loans, so 
the proportion of foreign currency earners taking foreign currency loans is always at least 
as high as that of local currency earners. 
17 
 
However, our model shows that not only the currency denomination of a firm’s cash 
flow is important, but also the magnitude of its cash flows compared to its potential loan 
repayments. Among firms with local currency earnings, firms with large revenues 
compared to their credit obligations are more likely to take foreign currency loans. 
As predicted by the extant literature, the choice of a foreign currency loan should 
further be negatively related to the firm-level distress costs. The impact of distress costs on 
loan denomination should be stronger the lower the share of income a firm receives in 
foreign currency and the lower the revenue. 
A key prediction of our model is that the choice of a foreign currency loan by local 
currency earners may be positively related to the opaqueness of the firm's revenue structure. 
More local currency earners choose foreign currency loans under imperfect information 
than under perfect information. The impact of information opaqueness is stronger for firms 
with higher shares of revenue in local currency (our model suggests that imperfect 
information does not alter the currency choice for firms with foreign currency earnings 
only). Worsening information opaqueness results in more levered firms (i.e., those with 
lower cash flow-to-loan ratios) to take foreign currency loans. 
At the macroeconomic level, our model predicts that the choice of a foreign currency 
loan will be positively related to the interest rate advantage on foreign currency funds 
which is given by nominal interest rate differential between local and foreign currencies 
minus the expected depreciation of the local currency (which is implicit and equals zero in 
our model). The impact of the interest rate differential, however, does depend on firm 
characteristics. The reaction to an increase in the interest rate differential should be stronger 
for firms with less income in foreign currency. 
The choice of a foreign currency loan will further be negatively related to exchange 
rate volatility. If the local currency is more likely to depreciate and also the larger the 
18 
 
depreciation, local currency earners (with low revenues) will be less likely to take a foreign 
currency loan. Moreover the impact of exchange rate volatility should be stronger for those 
firms with lower distress costs. 
Finally, our model suggests that characteristics of the banking sector or of the legal 
environment that exacerbate information asymmetries between banks and firms may foster 



























 𝐶  (1-p)/(1- λ) 
Partial pooling  
equilibrium 
Full pooling 
equilibrium Collapse of market 
for FX loans 
Partial pooling equilibrium 
Full pooling equilibrium 
𝐶  (1-p) *(φλ+1-λ)/(1- λ) 
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